Culture, inequality and the bureaucratic imagination: states and subjects for a new millenium by Saris, A. Jamie
CULTURE, INEQUALITY AND THE BUREAUCRATIC IMAGINATION:
STATES AND SUBJECTS FOR A NEW MILLENIUM
A. Jamie Saris
The space in which one examines is philosophically very different from the 
space in which one sees. (Gaston Bachelard, The Philosophy of No: A 
Philosophy of the New Scientific Mind)
Introduction
In this paper, I want to make a case for imagination as a ubiquitous, but neglected, 
modality in social life.1 Unfortunately, in such a short piece, I will not be able to offer 
anything like a comprehensive examination of such a complex term. Even confining 
ourselves to English-language speculation, for example, such a summary would still 
be huge. Just in the space between Hobbes’s rather lame sense of imagination as 
decaying sense (1992 [1651]) and Locke’s subtly subversive understanding of 
reflection (1700), imagination emerged as the spectre haunting anglophone 
philosophy’s empiricism. It is, arguably, one of the most interesting words in the 
English language and, while it appears in variations in parts of modern anthropology 
(such as ‘imaginary’ derived from the work of Lacan), its more natural language sense 
as a potential of certain kinds of thought is less well researched. In particular, the 
sense of this term denoting a way of visualizing a hoped-for better future – perhaps 
best expressed by one of the slogans connected to the wave of protests loosely 
referred to as ‘anti-capitalist’, that is, another world is possible – is less commonly 
examined. My interest in this paper, then, is in thinking about how we actively 
imagine the world in which we actually live, especially the connections within this 
global moment we are least inclined to see. If there is a slogan connected to my 
argument, it would run something like: this world is here because we are actively 
making it. Thus, there is a grimmer side to the case I am making – we are well along 
the road of imagining a world that is pretty unpleasant, and we had better start to 
understand some of the ways that this is actually done, if we want to go about 
changing it.
While there have been a variety of attempts to use imagination as a means of 
unpacking local situations (see Kaplan 1995, Aretxaga 2000, Comaroff and Comaroff 
2004, among many others), fewer theorists have looked at how imagination 
undergirds how an anthropology of the present global moment might account for what 
is not imaginable for the social sciences as well as their objects of study (Fernandez 
n.d. on imagination in the moral order takes this idea in a slightly different direction). 
Tellingly, the 2002 American Anthropological Association Annual Meetings was titled 
(Un)Imaginable Futures, emphasizing the common temporal orientation of the term I 
am trying to unpack here. Axel (2003), for example, has a very cogent critique of the 
theme of this volume, emphasizing the limits of imagination as a category of 
anthropological analysis on the basis of its coherence with the world of fact and some 
of the contradictions that he finds in Anderson’s sense of imagined communities 
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(1991), which he sees as one of the tap-roots of this use of the term imagination. 
Throughout, though, it is the positive sense of imagination that is emphasized.2
I believe that this use of imagination marks how closely the theoretical 
understanding of the term tracks its more quotidian usage. Much like an older idea of 
culture, others seem to have more imagination than ‘we’ do. Within ‘us’, certain 
classes of people removed from the workaday world, such as poets and other creative 
sorts, are understood to have more imagination than the run-of-the-mill person. Our 
day-to-day life, we suppose, is not a realm ruled by our imaginations (except as 
consumers of the products of the more imaginative among us, hence our connections 
to ‘imagined’ communities), and we mark this meaning of ‘imagination’ in our 
colloquialisms concerning the sorts of work and/or activities wherein the faculty is 
supposed to thrive, as opposed to our everyday existence. Instead, I argue that 
imagination clearly undergirds what we consider standard interpretations of public 
codes (what symbolic anthropology has long taken to be the real object of our 
researches); it speaks to the problem of legitimating power, and it is clearly bound up 
with how we know (and do not know) the world. My field for this excursion into the 
role of imagination is my reading of increasing structural and symbolic violence in the 
modern moment, alongside a case for why anthropology as a discipline should be 
interested in this issue.  
Is Seeing Believing?
I begin, then, with four scenarios all coming from only the past ten years, touching, in 
very different ways, on the imaginings of justice, equality, and seeing or not seeing 
various types of interconnections. 
1. Late 1990s. Jean Dubuisson, une miserable, from the central plateau of 
Haiti. When he was a child, his family, dispossessed by a USAID-funded 
development project under the despotic US-supported regime of Papa Doc, the Péligre 
Hydroelectric Dam, made the move from landed poor to desperate rural underclass. 
Unsure of his own age, he is sure that he has known ‘nothing but troubles’ in his life. 
He and his wife Marie watched two of their children die before the age of five. Since 
1990, Jean has been slowly dying of TB, an easily treatable disease that, since the late 
1980s, is claiming more lives than ever before in human history. Jean’s treatment in 
1998 cost only a couple of dollars a day, but the average income in Haiti was then 
only a little over $200/yr, and Jean was one of the people bringing down that average 
(Farmer 1999: 187–200). At about this same time, when Jean is slowly dying from a 
very treatable disease, the Human Genome Project is being completed, inspiring some 
medical researchers to begin to imagine vastly increased life-spans, perhaps even 
effective immortality, for at least some members of the human race in the foreseeable 
future.
2. Late 1990s. At the Universities of Warwick and Oxford, an elegant 
experiment – conducted by members of a seemingly rare breed, some imaginative 
economists – yields a perverse result. Subjects are provided virtual (but ultimately 
convertible) ‘currency’ and are then allowed to ‘bet’ on various topics, while a few are 
rewarded with large windfalls. Subjects have no contact with each other except 
through a computer terminal, but they are aware of each other’s winnings. After very 
large inequalities are established, participants are allowed to ‘burn’ others’ income at 
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some cost to their own. Much to the surprise of the ringmasters, 62% of the ‘losers’ 
incur further crippling losses to bring down the winnings of their ‘more successful’ 
counterparts. In the popular press, right-wing commentators (e.g., Mercer 2003) take 
the results of this experiment as confirmation of how envy lurks in the dark corners of 
an acontextual human nature, and, thus, they see the necessity of vigilance in a global 
economy still, in their way of thinking, too slow to reward life’s winners and to 
punish life's losers, in the manner in which they deserve.
3. 2000–2001, at several sites in the USA. Another experiment – in one sense, 
a depressingly familiar scene – that of monkeys being used as pharmacological 
models to measure the addictive potential of a drug, in this case, cocaine. The 
imaginative twist: macaques raised individually are allowed to form social groups, 
complete with dominance hierarchies. Cocaine is offered only after such hierarchies 
are established. The results: while all the monkeys try cocaine, only the ones on the 
bottom of the hierarchies self-administer as often as possible (the closest 
demonstration that those who torment monkeys have provided of what humans call 
‘addiction’). Furthermore, these monkeys show wide variance in Positron Emission 
Topography (PET) scans of their brains, with dominant ones showing higher numbers, 
and activity levels, of D2 receptors, which are implicated in the brain’s management 
of pleasure and aversion.  Conclusion: brain chemistry, individual history, 
pharmacological action, and social dynamics are difficult, if not impossible, to 
disaggregate (Morgan et al. 2002).
4. 2002, Dublin, Ireland. A woman, D in her early 20s, relates (to a research 
assistant on a state-funded project on opiate prevalence) the history of her near-
decade-long attraction to heroin, and her various, to date unsuccessful, attempts to 
come off the drug. The project is attempting to establish a clearer sense of the number 
of addicts in Ireland, at least 10 years into a serious heroin problem on the island, and 
twenty-plus years since the drug first emerged as a social issue in Dublin. After a 
paper and pencil instrument is filled in that measures types and amounts of 
compounds taken and that also develops some data on the woman’s sense of her social 
network, a longer conversation, developed over a few weeks, ensues. It proves 
impossible to get a simple narrative of her drug use without the details of the 
extraordinary amount of violence in her life – regular physical abuse in school as a 
youngster, victim and originator of violence as teenager, the experience of rape at 
sixteen. Currently, she is on probation and in treatment, but she will likely be 
homeless when she is released, and will probably find that prostitution (in which she 
has been occasionally involved) will be one of her only career options. During the 
course of almost five hours of interviews D mentions heroin and the concept of 
addiction only tangentially and under prodding of the interviewer.
Connections
My basic assertion is a simple one: these scenarios are related by their ways of 
making visible, or their pointing out ways of obscuring, a fundamental reality, perhaps 
the defining quality, of our historical moment – that of gross inequalities and their 
systematic reproduction. This problem, of course, is scarcely a new one.  Inequalities, 
like the laissez-faire economist’s sense of ‘the Poor,’ have always been with us. My 
point in this paper is not to bewail this fact; rather I want to think about the place that 
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inequalities have in our current imaginings, that is, the conditions of the possibility for 
what and how we currently see, and what we feel we should do about what we see. I 
also want to look at the mechanisms whereby this seeing or the lack of it happens. 
Finally, I want to reflect on the role of anthropological thinking in this complex of 
what is imaginable and what can be acted upon.
Humanity and Inequality
Human sociality is in crucial respects separated from other forms of animal sociality 
precisely because we can imagine our own inequalities and assign them various 
valences. Minimally, we can imagine ones different from the one we are born with or 
into. More interestingly (and probably unique to our species), we can even imagine a 
society where such inequalities are eliminated or severely attenuated. The body of 
social theory out of which (at least anglophone) anthropology develops, moreover, 
takes inequalities as one of the foundational issues of human sociality – something 
that is both necessary to, and potentially destructive of, any possibility of humans 
living peaceably and well together in groups. From Hobbes (1651) to Rawls (1971), 
theorists of the social contract have had to balance the idea of some equality with 
respect to political power and legal subjectivity with massive inequalities of talent, 
interests, life chances, strength and the like. It is hardly surprising, therefore, that 
arguments both for and against certain types of inequality have historically been 
politically contentious and rhetorically powerful. Few notions have been more potent, 
for example, than Rousseau’s (1992 [1729]) sense of ‘unnatural’ inequalities (those 
based on une sorte de convention imposed on a theoretically more fundamental 
equality of Man), as a means of rallying political forces in the cause of social change 
in recent Western history. Despite being declared dead and buried several times over 
the past 250 years, this idea of a fundamental human equality is still powerful enough 
that Stephen Pinker, a psycholinguist at MIT has recently written yet another book 
attempting to ‘debunk’ it (Pinker 2002).
For this reason, imagination is an important but underappreciated aspect of 
governance. Technocratic control of populations, appropriation of resources, and 
application of bureaucracy all require both imagined entities to manipulate and, 
crucially, imagined endpoints as goals. At the same time, resistance to various 
technocratic projects also requires imagination, mobilizing constructs, such as the 
perceived locus of agency in social life and the sense of logical routes to influence 
outcomes of initiatives. For such projects to succeed, states and subjects must also 
imagine what they cannot change, indeed, what they cannot see.
Thus, we come to the condition of possibility for the four scenarios above, 
which is the historical moment in which we find ourselves, at the end of, or at least 
adrift in, History, almost twenty years after the fall of the Berlin Wall, and the de facto 
triumph of a globalized capitalist order complete with US-military enforcement 
between states, and the largely uninterrupted growth of neo-liberal policies within 
polities, more or less without any credible material or ideological opposition. In this 
current wave of imagining, the market has emerged as the master metaphor of social 
life, and wide (and widening) inequalities, with their attendant affective states in 
ontological individuals of fear and greed, are the mechanics of this imagining of the 
market. Whatever the perils or the possibilities of this epoch, it is a moment when 
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inequalities have never been greater both within and between societies and when the 
language in which to discuss certain kinds of inequalities has never been more meager 
in certain disciplines, including, I would argue, Anthropology. Hence the main, if not 
the only, paradox in our four cases above: we have, on the one hand, disciplines 
predicated on an ontological individual – economics and pharmacology – almost by 
accident, developing persuasive evidence that a socially-produced sense of equality 
and inequality is everything from a fundamental aspect of our behavioural 
environment to an important influence on our very biology,3 and we have social 
sciences, which have historically taken the ontological embeddedness of human 
beings in social groups as a given, finding it harder and harder to theorize what 
Jonathan Kozol (1991), an American writer, almost twenty years ago called ‘Savage 
Inequalities’ in any principled way.  
What States and Subjects See
Models of bureaucracy have generally been dominated by metaphors of sight. We 
have become inured to terms like ‘transparency’ and ‘vision’ when discussing social 
policies and/or their origins and effects in modern industrial democracies. Similarly, 
analyses and/or critiques of the state have long conceded the centrality of vision in 
their terminology and analyses. ‘Bureaucratic gaze’, ‘panopticon’, and ‘inspectorial’ 
are easy-to-find descriptions in analyses of the state and its knowledge about its 
subjects. The visual metaphor also organizes our description of resistance to power. 
Resistance and escaping the gaze of a presumably totalizing state are equated in terms 
like ‘hidden transcripts’, ‘covert resistance’, and ‘subaltern history,’ all presumably 
obscure from, if not actually occult to, the gaze of the powerful. Knowledge and 
research is similarly imagined – making visible the previously obscure.  In short, 
seeing has been related to the exercise of power – in this sense of being able to 
manipulate something – and its lack has been linked to the ability to avoid power.
Researchers interested in the relationship of sight to power in the sense above 
too often cite the seminal thinking of Michel Foucault in an off-hand way as support 
of this position (e.g., 1975). Foucault’s way of thinking about sight, however, could 
not be more at odds with this crypto-positivist reading of a sense of vision. The visual 
in the panopticon or in the doctor’s gaze would better be put as a gerundive, that is, 
the visualizing of something.4 Far from seeing something already there, sight, 
subjectivity, and power simultaneously imply each other in this way of thinking. Less 
obvious, though, has been what invisibility implies for power. Bourdieu’s sense of 
institutional forgetting as an important part of his idea of ‘symbolic violence’ gets to 
this issue, but more after the fact (Bourdieu 1977, 1991). Mary Douglas in How 
Institutions Think also struggles with this issue. Unwilling to locate power or agency 
in anything but concrete individuals, however, she is forced to define institutions in 
terms of getting individuals within their matrix to think alike, and she recuperates the 
similarly Durkheimian sense that classifying is the privileged way that such thinking 
proceeds. As usual in such analyses, power is difficult to locate; individuals by 
definition do not exercise power over institutions, but only individuals can have 
agendas and interests for Douglas (for critique, see Saris 1995). Surely, though, if we 
construct the visible in social life, we must also hammer out an agreement as to what 
we cannot see.
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(Re)visioning the State
Still, if one imagines the state as a set of institutions (a venerable and defensible 
position), then what we might call their current configuration of imagination, that is 
how they imagine they see or what they fail to see, and how they remember or forget, 
is very interesting. Part of our historical moment, we are told (whether this moment is 
heralded or bemoaned), is the so-called roll-back of the state: the removal of 
bureaucracy, the relaxing of regulations, and the cutting of taxes all leading to a 
smaller, more efficient government, a greater scope for private life and civil society, 
and more self-reliance in individuals. Many researchers, myself included, have 
questioned this assertion, especially as it applies to those losing socio-economic 
ground in the new society (Farmer 2004, Saris et alii 2002, among many others). One 
of the signal aspects of inequalities in the moment in which we live, for example, is 
how much of the state the dispossessed actually do see, whether this is the spectacular 
growth over the past twenty years of the carceral state in the US or the seemingly 
gentler ways that chronic social problems are being ‘communitized’ and regulated by 
semi-state bodies interested in ‘community development’ in some parts of Europe. 
Amongst too many of les miserables de la terre, especially those in so-called ‘failed’ 
states in the South, moreover, the problem is not a lack of state organs, but precisely 
their proliferation amongst various factions, all attempting to exercise an often brutal 
governmentality over the same imagined territory and population. Armies consisting 
of strung-out adolescents, whose machetes are the only reliable weapons they possess, 
are led by men whom insist on the trappings of state bureaucracy.
It is especially easy, though, to miss how intrusive a presence is the state in 
certain areas and populations in so-called ‘developed’ society. As always, perhaps, the 
United States serves as the best window on this process. Television productions 
developed in the US, like COPS (now in its 700th episode), celebrate the most crude 
manifestations of state presence – heavily armed, uniformed forces, swooping into 
certain (always poor, generally black and brown) neighbourhoods, appealing to a 
white, mostly middle-class audience that responds to political appeals to banish 
government intrusion into their own lives. The State is not just made visible but 
actually valorized for this population – a sort of value-for-money advertisement for 
their reduced tax burden. Other shows that have become popular in both North 
America and Western Europe, especially the odious Big Brother, are not just the 
voyeuristic celebration of boring, mediocre individuals as many critics have justly 
claimed; instead, they exist as a sort of inside joke that we share with ourselves about 
the tenuousness of our own privacy in the face of the ubiquity of surveillance 
technology like CCTV and CARNIVORE.5 In my own work, for example, it 
astonishes me how certain commentators in Ireland can talk about the ‘roll-back’ of 
the state – the 8 or so neighbourhoods in the capital that score worst in the Trute-
Haaze Deprivation Index, that also provide the overwhelming majority of the prison 
population, are also the target of multiple, very well-intentioned ‘community-based’ 
interventions (again financed by the state). Even the idea that the state has become 
smaller and less powerful would certainly be news in such places (see Saris et alii 
2002).  
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While the popular and state imaginings of such connections have seemingly 
become impoverished, and even academic research slow to investigate certain 
connections (for exceptions see Davis 2003 and Elsner 2005), other analysts have had 
fewer difficulties. In the aftermath of a fatal prison riot in New Mexico in the US, for 
example, the Business Section of the Albuquerque Tribune ran a brief background 
piece on Wackenhut, the corporation making a tidy profit out of the state contract to 
run this prison, by (1) overcrowding and (2) cutting the number of guards on shift at 
any one time.6
Crime does pay, if you’re in the private corrections business. Talk about 
demand: The nation’s inmate population has grown 228 per cent from 1980 to 
1996. ‘We not looking at a slowdown in the numbers of prisoners’, says Doug 
McDonald, senior associate at Abt Associates Inc. in Cambridge, Mass. 
‘Politicians still like to run against crime. We have longer and longer 
sentences. There are more people going away for longer periods of time.’ And, 
he adds, ‘Legislatures aren’t interested in spending money for 
prisons.’ (Albuquerque Tribune, Business Section 17/6/03)
Such arguments, connecting various decisions by elites, with bad (even deadly) 
outcomes for certain less powerful people, enabled by society-wide forms of bad 
faith, would seem radical in an Opinion/Editorial column of the New York Times, or 
even the Guardian, but it registers as a literal description in the Business Section of a 
paper from the US Sunbelt.  
We might, then, ask ourselves why this is so. Radical transformations in the 
size, form and function of state institutions geared to the dispossessed have been 
remarkably integrated, and remarkably little investigated by anthropologists 
(exception Rhodes 2003). We know, for example, that prison populations have 
boomed in the US over the past twenty-odd years, but we scarcely realize how diverse 
these institutions have become, with some US prisons and jails being amongst the 
largest in-patient psychiatric institutions in the world, others existing as a sort of 
domestic destination of out-sourced telemarketing jobs, and still others functioning as 
models of factory production that have largely abandoned in the developed world. 
Further, at least some US researchers have pointed out how the statistics of the 
remarkable growth of the US prison size exist in defiance of both trends in the crime 
rate and the growth of population (e.g., Davis 2003).
Shulman examines some of these connections in his book, The Betrayal of 
Work (2003). A key theme of this analysis is the prevalence of mismatched 
assumptions about ‘work’ in the United States in the twenty-first century especially 
the harsh reality that so-called unskilled workers face there. These assumptions 
resonate with other neoliberal economic situations, such as that found in Ireland and 
the United Kingdom. Four such assumptions are (1) that social mobility is as possible 
as ever for the working poor in America, (2) that by improving their skills on the job, 
workers can significantly increase their wages, (3) that globalization is universally 
responsible for the marginalization of American workers, and (4) that private and 
religious charities provide the best medicine for those trapped in the new poverty.
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All of these assumptions imagine collective action through elected 
government as either a hindrance or futile in the face of larger forces. While the ways 
that such an argument serves the interests of elites is easy to unpack, how often do we 
connect this ideological success of neo-liberalism to the relative attractiveness of 
prison employment in much of America for those on the wrong side of widening 
inequalities (it is only partially exposed to the most brutal of market forces, better 
unionized than the rest of the workforce, and seemingly protected, for the moment at 
least, from out-sourcing).7 Much like the army, it is, in short, one of the narrowing 
range of decent career paths for those labelled ‘unskilled’ by the masters of the new 
global economy. My point is that, despite some macro-analyses of the politics of 
widening inequalities (e.g., Klein 2004), we have only begun to investigate the 
mechanics of this system as a system. Much more work needs to be done, for 
example, on the symbolic coherence of this new configuration. Where does 
legitimacy come from, for example, now that the state concedes its limitations so 
readily (say with respect to migrant populations and certain security issues)? How is 
legitimating power performed successfully now that the middle classes in most 
advanced industrial economies seem to be at best suspicious of elections? How are 
certain populations on the wrong side of these widening inequalities being managed in 
newer equations of governmentality, and how do they respond to this management?8
Examples could, of course, be multiplied, but my basic argument should be 
clear enough. We live at a moment of vastly heightened inequalities, ones that have 
been deliberately (and relatively recently) brought about by decisions made by elites, 
both within polities and in terms of powerful international organizations imposing 
their will on weaker entities (generally developing countries). These inequalities have 
very bad implications for those at the wrong end of them. Within the so-called 
advanced industrial democracies, these recently-heightened inequalities have been 
regulated by a massive growth in certain parts of the state, at a time when the social 
presence of state power is supposedly in retreat. I need not spend much time on the 
observation that the new international order has been accompanied by a growth in 
militarized intervention, initially led by NATO, and increasingly just the United 
States, nor that the same failed economic policies tending to magnify inequalities 
within polities are being exported time and again, generally under threat, in this New 
World Order. Despite the production of this global order of great benefit to the already  
rich and powerful, underwritten by the military muscle of the most powerful state – 
something that looks rather like imperialism – we are told that never has democracy 
been stronger in world history, and we have even been informed that the corner has 
been turned on beating global poverty.9 In short, there seems to be a system of 
interlocking symbolic and material elements, the result of active and passive choices 
by subjects in a variety of structural positions, differentially handicapping specific 
areas and populations.
The Work of Culture
Where does anthropology, a small discipline not very used to thinking of itself as 
central to politically powerful discourses, fit into all this? A less obvious (and, indeed, 
far less commented on) aspect of this growth in the production and management of 
structural violence is an invigorated imagination of the culture concept that occurs at 
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almost exactly the same period. From the revival of the culture of poverty argument 
connected to the ‘underclass’ in the US and the UK from the mid-1980s,10 to the 
concept of community in ‘Community Development’ and the maintenance of 
corporatist solidarity in Europe from about the same time (Rose 1996), to the tensions 
within nation-states about the flood of immigrants that the new global economy both 
creates and demands, to the Think Tank success of Samuel Huntington’s The Clash of 
Civilizations in explaining conflicts between states, non-state actors and groups of 
states, something like the culture concept has never been more firmly linked to power 
both within and between polities (see especially, Harrison and Huntington 2000). 
Culture now ‘explains’ the differential rates of success and failure of populations 
within countries being fundamentally remade by neo-liberal policies (Rose 1996); it 
lurks as the ultimate cause of otherwise inexplicable civil wars at the edges of the 
global economy (Huntington 1996); it is the reason why immigrants suffer 
discrimination within nation-states; it motivates better and worse health outcomes in 
the face of diseases of scarcity and excess; and it provides a convincing narrative (at 
least to some) of why Pax Americana is being resisted, most obviously if not 
exclusively, in parts of the Islamic world. It seems to me that only at its crudest end 
can this explanation be read as simple false consciousness – voodoo practices as a 
reason for the spread of AIDS in Haiti or the famous analysis of Paul O’Neill, the 
(former) US Treasury secretary on a recent tour of Africa with Bono, claiming that 
triple anti-retroviral therapy for HIV/AIDS would not be cost effective in Africa 
because the lack of cultural acquaintance with wristwatches would make keeping to 
the relatively stringent dosing schedule too difficult for the natives – but these are the 
least interesting cases. Here artifice overwhelms whatever art there may be in this 
kind of ‘explanation’ where ‘bad faith’ seems a more persuasive description than 
‘false consciousness’.  
It is the ontology that such a form of bad faith supposes, and how someone 
might imagine its persuasiveness, however, that I want to illuminate with another 
imagined scenario. Imagine Ruth Benedict, magically returned from the other side 
more than seventy years after the publications of Patterns of Culture, examining the 
statement above. Paul O’Neill, discussing perhaps the most pressing health problem 
the world currently faces, elaborates an ontology of cultural difference that ‘explains’ 
one of the primary social-medical cleavages in the modern moment – how AIDS/HIV 
looks rather like diabetes in the so-called developed world and like the Black Death or 
Spanish Flu in the ‘less developed’ parts of the globe. Taken together, say, with some 
of the examples cited above, she could justifiably be forgiven for thinking that 
anthropologists were closely involved in the formulation of a variety of powerful 
discourse concerning everything from foreign policy to the administration of social 
problems within nation-states, even if she might disagree with the uses of the concepts 
in this instance.  
In a sense, our revenant might still be correct. In the United States (again) 
anthropologists using a very Benedictian sense of culture are now advising on such 
diverse topics as how the US Army might kill more effectively and with less collateral 
damage in its ‘War on Terror’ (see Stannard 2007 and for critique see Price 2007) to 
how cost and populations can be managed to maintain the current structure of health-
care delivery. Some commentators even place a ‘classic’ national character study, The 
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Arab Mind by Raphael Patai (1976), as one of the roots of the neo-conservative 
assault on the Islamic world.  And in Europe, anthropologists have found new avenues 
for funding for social policy-relevant research using a superficially similar 
understanding of ‘culture’.
On the other hand, our revenant would be very wrong with respect to the 
discipline as a whole. Clearly, this growth of the acceptance of what might charitably 
be called an untheorized sense of culture outside of anthropology has been 
accompanied by a retreat from the concept in the discipline that gave ‘culture’ its 
modern definition.11 The words that we have used to replace it, especially in thinking 
about so-called transnational phenomena, seem to me to be even less sensitive to 
issues of power and structural violence, especially in understanding their material and 
symbolic integration. What the current moment should force us to do is to think 
seriously about Gramsci’s famous dictum concerning the relationship of class and 
culture, that ‘The question of power is at the heart of the theorization of culture’ 
Gramsci (1983: 126–32). As Kate Crehan has recently pointed out in an interesting 
work on Gramsci and culture, the sense of ‘culture’ in the Prison Notebooks has 
important differences from its use in, especially American, anthropology (2002: ch.5). 
Gramsci saw hegemony as being built on the back of partial and contingent symbolic 
systems created by differentially placed populations with clearly unequal access to 
power within a definite political-economic structure (Crehan 2002). There was no 
necessary coherence in these systems and Gramsci was fairly dismissive of those 
academics, such as folklorists, who searched for such coherence. Gramsci’s most 
obvious descendant in the scenarios that began this paper would be the Critical 
Medical Anthropology perspective of Paul Farmer, who largely sees ‘culture’ as a 
form of false consciousness, especially when mobilised as an explanation for misery 
in Haiti, and who tends to be very chary in its use. At best, in this way of thinking, 
culture encourages certain forms of bad faith, and at worst it simply hides the 
machinations of power (2004).
To put it as briefly as possible, I believe that this critique too easily abandons 
the theoretical and methodological strengths of modern anthropology, and, further, it 
misses the symbolic coherence that is an important part of a successful hegemonic 
project. If we are not to abandon some sense of coherence in symbolic systems, 
however, we will need to rethink coherence in the face of power and hegemony, and 
the privileged sphere for this reanalysis seems to me to be the imagination. This sense 
of imagination will not be in the sense of a new field, but as a ubiquitous (but 
theoretically neglected) modality of social life that is central to what we are doing in 
the here and now. I am not persuaded that a two-decade-long project stressing 
hybridity, -scapes, fragments, and the like have moved us as far forward as we might 
be in understanding our shared historical moment in this sense. In short, we are not 
merely in Fabian’s term ‘coeval,’ we are interconnected in ways that would have 
seemed fanciful only a couple of decades ago. ‘Globalization’ is only a convenient 
label, not an explanation, for this process.  
Conclusion
Minimally, having the courage of our current professed theoretical convictions forces 
us to face some potentially grim realities connected to this realization. If we do 
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construct significant parts of our social world, at least in part through a concordance 
of symbols within our imaginations, then we are well on our way to building a pretty 
grim reality in which to live. It is a reality that is deaf to the calls of the suffering; that 
has an impoverished register in which to discuss subjectivity; and one that has a very 
narrow sense of ‘meaning’ in power and politics. If we really believe that imagination 
is to be one of the midwives of  ‘another world’, then we are over-late in investigating 
how it is under-girding and reproducing the one in which we currently find ourselves. 
On this ground, such diverse phenomena as the sociology of knowledge, the analysis 
of advertising and popular culture, the study of elites, as well as those of so-called 
‘new’ social movements can be brought into productive connection with one another. 
It is an area that the tools and thinking of anthropology should be especially suitable 
to map.
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Endnotes
1 This essay has its roots in two presentations, Engaging Imagination, 19–21 June 2003, University 
College Dublin and Dublin Business School, Dublin, Ireland, and at the Medical Anthropology 
Seminar, Harvard Medical School in March 2004. 
2 There is, of course, an enormous philosophical literature on imagination, e.g. Sallis 2000. I wish to 
confine my argument in this piece to some of the specific ways that anthropology has used the terms.
3 More evidence for a sense of fairness in animals can be found in Brosnan and de Waal (2003)
4 Wolf (1999) makes a very similar case in his volume on ‘envisioning’ power.
5 The acronym for the FBI’s computer programme to sift masses of e-mails for sensitive data.  
Effectiveness is less an issue (consider 9/11), than the shared sense that such techniques exist and could 
be used.  Imagine the outcry in the seemingly conformist 1950s, if J. Edgar Hoover had announced the 
ubiquitous opening of letters in every post office in the nation.
6 Actually, the situation is even worse than it sounds, as the company clearly tried to deceive its 
inspectors by pretending to have more guards than they actually had on a pre-riot visit in the wake of 
complaints from some of their employees to the oversight body.
7 See Saris 2004. Coulter 1999 makes a similar case for how the Troubles in Northern Ireland helped 
insulate the province from Thatcherism.
8 John Gledhill (1999) discusses the metaphor of visibility in a very sophisticated way in his 
development of the notion of ‘the shadow state’, especially in his analysis of the production of violence 
at the edge of believability 
9 See World Bank, 2002. Global Economic Prospects and the Developing Countries: Making Trade 
Work for the Poor. For a devastating critique of the methodology of this report, especially the sleight-
of-hand employed around the idea of the equivalence of purchasing power, see Sanjay G. Reddy and 
Thomas W. Pogge, March 2003, How Not To Count The Poor – http://www.columbia.edu/~sr793/.  For 
a general summary of the debate, see Monbiot 2003 ‘Rich in Imagination’.
10 Wilson 1987, Murray and Herstein 1994, and continued in the UK by Dalrymple 2003. For critique, 
see Wilson 1992 and Wacquant 1997. 
11 One of the few works in the 1990s using the concept of ‘culture’ in this sense is Kuper’s Culture: An 
Anthropologist’s Account (1999). In this piece, he more or less debunks the culture concept.  The 
relationship of anthropology to its conceptual progeny has been broached in a more serious way in 
recent years, with a Special Edition of American Anthropologist (September 2004) dedicated to 
recuperating Boas’s legacy.
